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Bahrain redux

It is hard to believe Bahrain sought to become a global education hub as recently as 2006 & 2007. See, for example, this Observatory on Borderless Higher Education report released in January 2007:

Welcome to Bahrain, circa December 2011:

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Bahrain’s reputation is in tatters a mere four years later, and the ruling Khalifa family is showing no signs of being able to coordinate a genuine reform agenda.

Those of you interested in up-to-date developments in Bahrain are advised to track the #Bahrain hashtag on Twitter…a veritable feast of links to commentary, analysis, arguments, information, and video clips. Also see, of course, the independent commission report that investigated the 2011 uprising and its aftermath (the 513 page report is summarized here by the New York Times, 23 November 2011).

Source: Universities UK (2011) Driving Economic Growth, London: Universities UK, 1 December; also see Chester, J., and Luzajic, J. (2011) ‘Time to recognise that universities have a central role in UK growth strategy,’ The Guardian, 1 December.

Source: EdStats, Education Advisory Service, World Bank.

Note: our thanks to Emilio Porta of the World Bank for permission to post these slides on GlobalHigherEd.

These two graphics (both released in the last two days) capture broad-based aspects of the fiscal squeeze confronting public higher education in the United States.

Source: Moody’s (2011) Weekly Credit Outlook, 31 October, p. 43.

Source: ‘Chart: One Year of Prison Costs More Than One Year at Princeton,’ The Atlantic, 1 November 2011. A direct link to the chart by Joseph Staten (an “info-graphic researcher with Public Administration“) is available here.

While these graphics are not comprehensive in nature, and I’m positioned in one specific state (Wisconsin), a number of dynamics are arguably intersecting:

  • Progressively reduced levels of state support for public higher education (see image 1 above). Despite this, there is no correlation, whatsoever, between declining levels of state support and the desire to govern public higher education systems and institutions.
  • A public university funding burden shifting to student-derived revenue (primarily via tuition fees). Indeed we’re past the tipping point now for, as Moody’s stated this week, “[a]lthough most colleges and universities are improving operating efficiency and expense containment, a college’s ability to increase net tuition remains a critical credit risk factor for the sector;”
  • Ideologically-derived views emerging, within some ruling political circles, that frame fiscal crisis as an integral element of engendering structural change within higher education systems and institutions. A case in point is this Cato Institute report (How Much Ivory Does This Tower Need?) and associated video coverage, both released last week;
  • Given the above fiscal constraints, increased competition for state support (e.g., prisons, as patently evident above);
  • Enhanced use of the principle of ‘flexibility‘ as a vehicle to (a) increase efficiencies, (b) ameliorate a symbolic but only small portion of budget cuts, and (c) gain enhanced control over the governance of higher education systems and institutions.

One of the ironies of the situation is that public universities in the United States are actually, despite their reputations, not very market-oriented in comparison to those in countries like Australia, New Zealand, and England (at least when it comes to one revenue stream – fee paying foreign students- that could be enhanced). See, for example, this Ombuds report (26 Oct 2011) from the Australian State of Victoria which outlines a variety of serious problems with the way Australian higher education institutions handle and support (or fail to) their foreign students.

In my biased opinion (after living here for 10 years), most of the ‘US publics’ are remarkably ‘public good’ and scholarly in orientation: they have long been willing to focus on serving their respective states’ residents, while also indirectly supporting foreign students via graduate fellowships, TA- and PA-ships, and so on. Of course they are mandated to support in-state students (especially at the undergraduate level), but still, the necessary ideological/regulatory work to engender systemic change to draw in substantially more foreign students has not really occurred, to date.  This is evident in the statistics profiled in one of my recent entries (‘International student mobility highlights in the OECD’s Education at a Glance 2011′), which again shows the US with a relatively low percentage of foreign students relative to total student numbers.

Will the future see a continued fiscal squeeze put on public higher education in the US? If so, what will ‘give’ even more that it has, to date? I’m particularly curious if the public mandate to serve state residents will loosen up such that the territoriality of admissions becomes progressively, if haltingly, more and more global. This is likely to be a hot-button issue in most US states, but it is one that needs to be confronted and debated in a serious way given the structural problems that regional (ie state) politicians have helped to create via year-after-year budget decisions that generate the patterns evident in the two images above. One way or another, confronting the austerity-induced fiscal squeeze that public higher education faces in the US cannot help but be a messy affair.

Kris Olds

‘Flexibility’ is genuinely slippery concept, one that provides some sense of coherence with vagueness. It is also a concept that is a resource to be used in the pursuit of power.

I’m most familiar with the concept of flexibility in relationship to the changing nature of production systems. There has been a long debate in Economic Geography, for example, about phenomena like ‘flexible specialization’ and ‘flexible accumulation’. These interrelated concepts have helped scholars and industry analysts make sense of how production systems are evolving to cope with increasingly levels of competitive pressure, the emergence of global value chains, new forms of territorial development, and so on.

The concept of flexibility was also used, in abundance, when I lived and taught in Asia until 2001. It was frequently used in association with the corporatization (aka autonomy) agendas occurring at the same time as Asian higher education systems and institutions (HEIs) were expanding. Since then numerous systems of higher education (including Singapore, Malaysia, China) have seen expansion going hand in hand with rapid increases in funding, along with enhanced flexibility with respect to governance. Implementation problems exist, of course, and autonomy and flexibility mean different things to different people, but this was and still is the broad tenor of change.

It’s surely a sign of the times in America that we have also seen an expansion of the use of the concept of flexibility, though linked not to increased levels of funding, but to striking budget cuts. Given this, the concept of flexibility needs to be interrogated. This entry does that, though only in a very exploratory manner.

As noted above, flexibility is emerging as a keyword in some ongoing higher education debates in the US. For example, it is frequently used in in association with the ‘Charter University’ agenda in several states (e.g., Ohio). Closer to home (for me), flexibility was a mantra in deliberations and communications about the proposed ‘New Badger Partnership‘ (NBP) initiative put forward by the recently departed Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Carolyn ‘Biddy’ Martin) as well as the University of Wisconsin System alternative known as the ‘Wisconsin Idea Partnership‘ (WIP). If realized, the NBP would have led to the separation of UW-Madison from the UW System, along with numerous flexibilities and enhanced autonomy (from the System & the State). See here for an April 2011 summary of key elements of the NBP (vs the WIP), including proposed ‘flexibilities’ with respect to:

  • Budgeting
  • Tuition/Pricing
  • Human Resources
  • Capital Planning/Construction
  • Financial Management
  • Purchasing/Procurement
  • Governance
  • Accountability

In the end, the NBP was not supported by the State Government due to a complicated array of political factors, as well as a problematic planning process that generated ineffectual support on our campus.

Now, while the NBP is unlikely to be resurrected, some elements of it have been incorporated into the unfolding governance agendas reshaping both the future of the UW System and UW-Madison itself.  A state-appointed “Special Task Force on UW Restructuring and Operational Flexibilities” was recently established to consider the future of the UW System (it will report back by January 2013).

Given the debates about the NBP to date, and the announcement of even more budget cuts last week, it is inevitable that the  ‘flexibility’ mantra will continue to exist. Indeed last week we witnessed one Wisconsin politician (Alberta Darling) state that:

[U]niversities could use budget flexibilities passed by lawmakers in June as part of the budget. “It’s not going to be easy, but it can work out,” Darling said.

But what is the full meaning and significance of flexibility with respect to higher education? I’m not 100% sure, to be honest, but what I have noted is that there is more missing from the debate about ‘flexibility as solution’ than there is present. In short, there is a surprising absence of information about what flexibility is and can be defined as, what it can help achieve, and what its costs and limitations are.

There is also an absence of discussion about the long-term implications of relying on ‘flexibility’ to play a significant role in resolving what are in reality structural problems including the steady decline of state support for higher education, as well as the absence of a compact about optimal and necessary levels of support for public higher education. In other words the flexibility debate is a problematically truncated one.

In the interest of helping myself sort things out, I’ve put together a few thoughts and questions about flexibility. Please feel free to disagree with them, and/or add more to the list:

  • Flexibility as legitimacy vehicle: The discourse of ‘flexibility’ masks the scale of budget cuts by tying painful cuts to a hoped-for (and unbudgeted, see below) mediating factor. The chance of new flexibilities generating enough savings or new revenue streams to significantly cover the costs of proposed and actual budget cuts cannot be anything but marginal. The language of new forms of flexibility can let politicians off the hook in that they do not need to accept, in public and in private, responsibility for the full scale of the cuts they themselves are proposing.
  • Flexibility as reward: US politicians seem to be putting forth new flexibilities as a defacto reward of sorts if HEIs accept deep budget reductions. But why were these flexibilities held back for such a long time, including by politicians (Democrats as well as Republicans) who are ideologically predisposed to a constrained role for the state in the development process? And are these rewards indeed rewards for all? For example, flexibility on tuition can generate enhanced costs for students, or flexibility on governance can weaken the ability of some key stakeholders to participate in governance.
  • Flexibility as a means to enhanced governance: The offer of flexibility usually comes in association with significant budget cuts and new found demands regarding ‘accountability,’ ‘efficiency’, ‘transparency,’ and the like.  In most cases enhanced flexibilities come with enhanced forms of governance by Government, not less. These forms of governance can entail an attempt to reshape curricula, course offerings, program funding, faculty practices, etc. Agreements about some forms of flexibility have the capacity to enable Government to burrow more deeply, not less, into what happens within higher education institutions. The irony is that there is no correlation between declining levels of public funding and the desire to govern public HEIs.
  • Flexibility unbudgeted: Flexibilities are often put forward as a key solution to coping with budget cuts, but the potential cost savings associated with proposed changes are rarely (if ever) modeled in detail, nor in a transparent manner. This is arguably a politically-based ‘wish and a prayer’ approach to strategic planning.
  • Flexibility costs vis a vis implementation capabilities: The provision of many forms of flexibility involves shifts in the nature of governance, not its erasure. The recalibration process — pushing responsibilities up, or down (which is usually the case) — puts additional demands on the other units and officials. It is important to determine if these HEIs and officials have the capabilities to take on new responsibilities. If flexibility is distributed more widely, downwards, is there a ripple effect generated such that multiple units are now responsible versus the one before? Are proposed flexibilities more or less costly (in terms of labor costs) to implement in aggregate (e.g., across the campuses of a system)?
  • Flexibility’s power geometries: the application of ‘flexibilities’ in most institutional contexts involves the realignment of power relations at a state-HEI scale, and at an intra-institutional scale, with a planned breakdown of the status quo for good and bad. The realignment outcome often increases the power of some parties, and decreases the power of other parties. It is worth reflecting if this inevitable outcome is an implicit or explicit objective of proffered flexibilities, with an eye to the developmental agendas of various parties.

These are but six aspects I see associated with the emerging ‘flexibility’ agenda for public higher education in the US.

Who could be against flexibility? No one, really, and certainly not me (having worked in some very rigid systems of higher education)! But surely we need to be more critical about what the concept of flexibility really means given how frequently it is thrown around in this era of austerity. Given the nearly 200 years of building up a world class public higher education system in the US, the stakes are simply too high to allow concepts like flexibility be accepted at face value, especially if they mask agendas that are facilitating the decline of said system. This is the era of the ‘knowledge economy,’ after all, and higher education is a critically important dimension of the systems of innovation we are dependent upon for future prosperity.

Kris Olds

Our era of ‘global urbanization’ — one where the majority of the world’s population now lives in ‘urban’ areas – raises some interesting opportunities and challenges for higher education systems and institutions. This issue came to mind today when Roger Keil (Professor and Director, The City Institute at York University) tweeted a link to this story (‘How Cities Grow: Dispersion, not Densification‘) by Wendell Cox.

What Cox, Keil, Koolhaas, Kotkin, McGee, Sudjic, and many other urban analysts are pointing out is that we are seeing not just the growth of the proportion of the world’s population living in cities, but also the emergence of new spatial patterns and orders; ones associated with more dispersed and therefore less dense concentrations of people than in older (denser) ‘urban’ areas.

This emerging pattern is associated with terms like extended metropolitan regions, exurbs, edge city, borderless cities, megapolitan areas, megalopolis, the ’100 Mile City,’ and the like. There are some important differences between these terms and their origins (some of which go back many decades), but for the purposes of this blog entry we’ll leave the differences to the side.

Here are a few graphics to flag some dimensions of the global urban era. Graphic 1 is from UN Habitat’s Global Report on Human Settlements 2011 (p. 3), graphic 2 is from nordphil.com, and graphic 3 is from UN Habitat’s State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011:

And here are a few comments, from Cox’s piece in newgeography, on the dispersal dimension of urbanization:

Analysts occasionally note that urban areas (“cities”) are becoming larger and denser. This is only half right. It is true that most of the world’s urban areas are becoming larger, with megacities like Delhi, Jakarta, Shanghai, Beijing and Manila adding more than five million people in the last decade and most other urban areas are growing, but not as fast.

Understanding Urban Areas: However almost without exception, urban areas are getting less dense. ….

1960-1990 Data: Historical urban population density is not readily available. Kenworthy and Laube were pioneers in this area, publishing estimates from 1960 to 1990 for a number of urban areas. That data indicates density losses in the more than urban areas for which they were able to develop comparable data. The world average decline was 20 percent, ranging from 15 percent in the United States to 29 percent in Europe and 33 percent in Australia. While Tokyo was doubling in population, its population density was dropping 17 percent between 1960 and 1990. While Zurich was adding 21 percent to its population, it was becoming 13 percent less dense.

Recent Data: The dispersion continues, which is indicated by these high-income world cases:

  • Today, the ville de Paris has 700,000 fewer people than at its peak, and inner London (generally the former London County Council area) has lost more than 1,500,000 people since its peak. All growth has been in lower density suburban areas in both the London and Paris urban areas.
  • In the United States, urban areas with more than 1,000,000 population more than doubled in population from 1950 to 2000 (2010 data not yet available), while the population density dropped by nearly one-third. Detailed analysis indicates that this trend has continued over the past decade in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Seattle, St. Louis and other major US urban areas.
  • The dense core city of Seoul has been losing population and all growth has been in the suburbs, which are lower density.
  • The dense urban core of Milan has experience substantial population losses, while the less dense suburbs have captured all the growth.

Dispersion is not limited to high income urban areas, with declining densities in evidence across lower and middle income nations as well. For example:

  • Nearly all of the growth in Jakarta has been in the suburbs for the last 20 years, while the core has gained little in population. The net effect is a less dense, but much larger urban area, because the suburbs are not as dense.
  • Nearly all of the growth for 30 years in Manila has been in the suburbs, while the core city. Again, the urban area has become much larger, but much less dense because the suburbs are much less dense.
  • The dense core of Shanghai has lost population and all growth has been in the suburbs, which are lower density.
  • The population in the dense core of Beijing has nearly stopped growing, with nearly all population in the suburbs, which are lower density.
  • The core of Mumbai has lost population in two of the last three census periods, while all growth has been in the suburbs, which are lower density.
  • The urban core of Mexico City has been declining in population since 1960 and all of the growth has been in the suburbs, which are less dense.
  • The dense core city of Buenos Aires has fewer people today than in 1947, while at least 8 million people have been added to nearly 1,000 square miles of lower density suburbs.

Urban growth continues to be overwhelmingly in less dense suburban areas, rather than in the more dense urban cores, and as a result even as urban areas grow, they become less dense. This is how cities grow.

Now, we have seen the growth of tertiary enrollment at the same time that we have seen the emergence of the era of global urbanization.  The numbers evident below (in a graphic from p. 11 of UNESCO’s Global Education Digest 2009) also point to the rapid growth of enrollment numbers and levels outside of the West, albeit unevenly. I don’t have the data available about the proportion of these students enrolled in tertiary institutions located in ‘urban’ areas, but it would be safe to assume they are in the majority.

The questions I’d like to raise are these:

  1. Can and should the core ideas associated with the sociospatial structure of the university (including proximity; a unified administrative structure; substantial in-situ infrastructure investment; a primary (and for most, singular) office for faculty & staff; stable classroom locations for courses throughout a term) hold firm while the sociospatial structure of societies around the world is spreading horizontally across an increasing scale?
  2. Can we carry on assuming that people should/will come to a campus to receive all or a majority of their formal higher education? Or should higher education funders and providers progressively adjust institutional infrastructures, pedagogical practices, and broad ways of operating, to better serve people IN PLACES, versus drawing people to A PLACE?
  3. Do the locations of branch campuses that have been established in fast changing world regions (e.g., East Asia, the Gulf) reflect the distortion-creating draw of state-provided subsidies, or the potent (albeit unrealized) demands of qualified students scattered across much space within these regions? Does a base deep in the heart of global urbanization (e.g., coastal China, as evident above in graphic 2) offer unprecedented opportunities to reach humankind like never before?

On these points, I can’t help but think that the rise of the on-line for-profit higher education providers (e.g., Laureate International Universities), or the providers with smaller offices scattered through metropoli around the world (and indeed across parts of some metropolitan regions), reflect not just their ability to identify and serve new demographic segments of society, but perhaps in ways that also reflect the emerging new geographies we see in this era of global urbanization. In other words perhaps these higher education providers are less fixed in space since fixity is not one of their core objectives. I’m not suggesting that this stance is necessarily desirable, but it is worth thinking about carefully.

It is also worth questioning if traditional providers of higher education are built for the much more stretched out spatial era emerging in almost all of our world regions. And if not, what are the options — technological, organizational, etc. — for addressing a provider-society disconnect that will surely deepen over time?

Kris Olds

Well, it’s ranking season again, and the Times Higher Education/Thomson Reuters World University Rankings (2011-2012) has just been released. The outcome is available here, and a screen grab of the Top 25 universities is available to the right. Link here for a pre-programmed Google News search for stories about the topic, and link here for Twitter-related items (caught via the #THEWUR hash tag).

Polished up further after some unfortunate fall-outs from last year, this year’s outcome promises to give us an all improved, shiny and clean result. But is it?

Like many people in the higher education sector, we too are interested in the ranking outcomes, not that there are many surprises, to be honest.

Rather, what we’d like to ask our readers to reflect on is how the world university rankings debate is configured. Configuration elements include:

  • Ranking outcomes: Where is my university, or the universities of country X, Y, and Z, positioned in a relative sense (to other universities/countries; to peer universities/countries; in comparison to last year; in comparison to an alternative ranking scheme)?
  • Methods: Is the adopted methodology appropriate and effective? How has it changed? Why has it changed?
  • Reactions: How are key university leaders, or ministers (and equivalents) reacting to the outcomes?
  • Temporality: Why do world university rankers choose to release the rankings on an annual basis when once every four or five years is more appropriate (given the actual pace of change within universities)? How did they manage to normalize this pace?
  • Power and politics: Who is producing the rankings, and how do they benefit from doing so? How transparent are they themselves about their operations, their relations (including joint ventures), their biases, their capabilities?
  • Knowledge production: As is patently evident in our recent entry ‘Visualizing the uneven geographies of knowledge production and circulation,’ there is an incredibly uneven structure to the production of knowledge, including dynamics related to language and the publishing business.  Given this, how do world university rankings (which factor in bibliometrics in a significant way) reflect this structural condition?
  • Governance matters: Who is governing whom? Who is being held to account, in which ways, and how frequently? Are the ranked capable of doing more than acting as mere providers of information (for free) to the rankers? Is an effective mechanism needed for regulating rankers and the emerging ranking industry? Do university leaders have any capability (none shown so far!) to collaborate on ranking governance matters?
  • Context(s): How do schemes like the THE’s World University Rankings, the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), and the QS World University Rankings, relate to broader attempts to benchmark higher education systems, institutions, and educational and research practices or outcomes? And here we flag the EU’s new U-Multirank scheme, and the OECD’s numerous initiatives (e.g., AHELO) to evaluate university performance globally, as well as engender debate about benchmarking too. In short, are rankings like the ones just released ‘fit for purpose’ in genuinely shed light on the quality, relevance and efficiency of higher education in a rapidly-evolving global context?

The Top 400 outcomes will and should be debated, and people will be curious about the relative place of their universities in the ranked list, as well as about the welcome improvements evident in the THE/Thomson Reuters methodology. But don’t be invited into distraction and only focus on some of these questions, especially those dealing with outcomes, methods, and reactions.

Rather, we also need to ask more hard questions about power, governance, and context, not to mention interests, outcomes, and potential collateral damage to the sector (when these rankings are released and then circulate into national media outlets, and ministerial desktops). There is a political economy to world university rankings, and these schemes (all of them, not just the THE World University Rankings) are laden with power and generative of substantial impacts; impacts that the rankers themselves often do not hear about, nor feel (e.g., via the reallocation of resources).

Is it not time to think more broadly, and critically, about the big issues related to the great ranking seduction?

Kris Olds & Susan Robertson

Source: Common Curriculum Outline for Yale-NUS College (2 September 2011) via Wordle.

The OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011: Innovation and Growth in Knowledge Economies report was released on 20 September.  While I’ve only seen the summary (which is the source for the first three images below) and an informative entry (‘A Changing Landscape: University hotspots for science and technology‘) in the OECD’s Education Today weblog, it is interesting to see a now common pattern and message emerging in these types of reports, and in a series of like-minded conferences, workshops, and associated reports (e.g. the Royal Society’s excellent Knowledge, Networks and Nations: Global Scientific collaboration in the 21st century, March 2011):

(a) relative stasis or decline in the OECD member countries (though they still do dominate, and will for decades to come);

(b) relatively fast growth within the so-called BRIC countries; and

(c) increased international collaboration, both as outcome and as aspiration.

And it is the aspiration for international collaboration that is particularly fascinating to ponder, for these types of scoreboards — analytical benchmarking cum geostrategic reframing exercises really — help produce insights on the evolving ‘lie of the land,’ while also flagging the ideal target spaces (countries, regions, institutions) for prospective future collaboration. National development processes and patterns thus drive change, but they interact in fascinating ways with the international collaborative process, which drives more international collaboration, and on it goes. As Alessandra Colecchia of the OECD puts it:

What does this [the changing landscape, and emerging 'hotspots'] mean and why is it important? As students and researchers become more mobile, new sets of elite universities outside of the US could materialize. Whether or not we call it the “Banyan” or “Bonsai” League is yet to be determined, but it is clear that OECD countries may no longer have the monopoly on scientific excellence in higher education.

Luckily for us, education is generally not a zero-sum game. When others gain important insights and breakthroughs in science and technology, the entire field benefits. So wherever you are in the world, you can wear your college sweatshirt with pride.

True, though questions remain about the principles/missions/agendas driving international collaboration. For example, there is an ongoing scramble in Europe and North America to link up with research-active Brazilian institutions of higher education; an issue nicely summarized in today’s OBHE story titled ‘Brazil leads the charge from Latin America.’

As noted in the fourth image below (which was extracted from the Royal Society’s Knowledge, Networks and Nations: Global Scientific collaboration in the 21st century), the nature of coauthor-based collaboration with Brazil is changing, with some countries edging closer because scholar-to-scholar ties are deepening or thinning. The reconfiguration is most likely deepening from 2008 on as a slew of new policies, programs and projects get promoted and funded in both Brazil and actual or potential partner countries.

Some of the questions that come to my mind, after participating in some workshops where relations with Brazil are discussed include:

  • What values drive these new initiatives to reach out across space into and out of Brazil?
  • What disciplines are factored in (or not), and what types of researchers (junior? senior? elite? emerging?) get supported?
  • What languages are they dependent upon, and what languages will they indirectly promote?
  • Are these international collaboration drives built on the principle of ‘you are only as strong as your weakest link’ (i.e. an exclusive one), or are they attendant to the need for capacity building and longer time horizons for knowledge development?
  • Are these international collaboration drives built upon implicit and explicit principles of reciprocity, or otherwise?
  • What about the territorial dimensions of the development process? Will we see hotspot to ‘emerging hotspot’ linkages deepen, or will hotspots be linked up with non-hotspots and if so how, and why? Can an archipelago-like landscape of linked up hotspots ‘serve’ nations/regions/the world, or is it generative of exclusionary developmental tendencies?

These are but a few of many questions to ponder as we observe, and jointly construct, emerging ‘hotspots’ in the global higher education and research landscape.

Kris Olds

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Note: the first three images were extracted from the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011: Innovation and Growth in Knowledge Economies (Sept 2011). The fourth image was extracted from the Royal Society’s Knowledge, Networks and Nations: Global Scientific collaboration in the 21st century (March 2011).

As noted in a previous entry (‘Visualizing the globalization of higher education and research’), we’ve been keen to both develop and promote high quality visualizations associated with the globalization of higher education and research. On this note, the wonderful Floating Sheep collective recently informed me about some new graphics that will be published in:

The visualization and analysis for the images below (three of many!) was conducted by Dr. Mark Graham, Scott A. Hale and Monica Stephens, in collaboration with Dr. Corinne M. Flick and the Convoco Foundation.

Many thanks to Mark Graham for permission to post these fascinating visualizations on GlobalHigherEd.

Kris Olds & Susan Robertson

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The Location of Academic Knowledge (journals by country)

Academic Knowledge & Language (journals by language/country)

Academic Knowledge & Publishers

Education at a Glance 2011 was released today by the OECD. The report is replete with data about education systems, patterns, trends, etc., and is well worth reading.

Free copies of the full report (497 pp) and the highlights version (98 pp) are available in PDF format via the links I provided in this sentence.  An on-line summary is available here too, with links to country notes for Brazil  (in English; in Portuguese, Chile, Estonia, France (in French), Germany (in English; in German), Greece, Italy (in English; in Italian), Japan (in English, in Japanese), Korea, Mexico (in English; in Spanish), Spain (in English; in Spanish), and the United Kingdom.

While all of the sections are worth reading, I always find the data regarding international student mobility too hard to resist glancing at when the report first comes out. These six graphics, and associated highlights (all but the first extracted from the highlights version of Education at a Glance 2011) will give you a flavour of some of the noteworthy student mobility trends.  Further details regarding mobility trends and patterns can be found in the full report (pp. 318-339).

How many students study abroad?

  • In 2009, almost 3.7 million tertiary students were enrolled outside their country of citizenship, representing an increase of more than 6% on the previous year.
  • Just over 77% of students worldwide who study abroad do so in OECD countries.
  • In absolute terms, the largest numbers of international students are from China, India and Korea. Asians account for 52% of all students studying abroad worldwide.

 Where do students go to study abroad?

  • Six countries – Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States – hosted more than half of the world’s students who studied abroad in 2009.
  • The United States saw a significant drop as a preferred destination of foreign students between 2000 and 2009, falling from about 23% of the global market share to 18%.
  • The shares of foreign students who chose Australia and New Zealand as their destination grew by almost 2%, as did that in the Russian Federation, which has become an important new player on the international education market.

How many international students stay on in the host country?

  • Several OECD countries have eased their immigration policies to encourage the temporary or permanent immigration of international students, including Australia, Canada, Finland, France, New Zealand and Norway.
  • Many students move under a free-movement regime, such as the European Union, and do not need a residence permit to remain in their country of study.
  • On average, 25% of international students who did not renew their student permits changed their student status in the host country mainly for work-related reasons.

Other complementary reports released over the last month include:

The reworking of the global higher education landscape continues to generate a wide array of ripple effects at a range of scales (from the local through to the global). While not perfect, the OECD’s annual Education at a Glance 2011 does an excellent job providing much of the available data on these trends, and on a wide array of issues and phenomenon that help to shape these mobility outcomes. A comparative perspective, after all, helps to flag the place of individual countries’ in the broader and ever evolving landscape; a landscape that countries play a significant role in both constructing, and reacting to.

Kris Olds

Editors’ note: in late July we posted an entry (‘Decolonising our universities: another world is desirable‘) that profiled a conference statement reflecting significant unease regarding the dominance of the ‘Western’ model of higher education, including the university. A few weeks later, Ben Wildavsky posted a response (‘Academic Colonialism, False Consciousness, and the Western University Ideal‘). In our minds both contributions include valid points, but they both contain a significant number of generalizations: lines are drawn, and nuance and shades of grey are missing — a point one of us (Kris Olds) also made in a mid-August dialogue via Twitter with Ben Wildavsky, though Ben obviously disagreed!

In any case, the debate continues below, for one of the conference organizers (Professor C. K. Raju, School of Mathematical Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia) has now submitted a response to Ben Wildavsky’s critical take on the conference statement, and the ideas associated with it. We’ve posted Professor Raju’s text below, unedited, for it is clear that the issues are of some concern to many parties, and we don’t agree with Wildavsky that it is “condescending, not respectful, to murmur sympathetically in response to nonsense.” In our mind it is better to air thoughts, and interrogate them. For example, we have some concerns with C.K. Raju’s use of broad categorizations like “Western” and “non-Western,” and how they are associated with supposedly unified perspectives and institutional spaces. However, we do think the views of C.K Raju deserve an airing, and we are aware that they link into a variety of other currents of thought and initiatives  — some connected, some not — around the university as a ‘political project’ aimed at promoting particular kinds of knowledge and identities. For instance,  last week one of us (Susan) attended a conference in Bristol on the new role of the university and its role in innovation. A fascinating paper was presented by Surja Datta on the history of India’s first university and the key role it played in providing lower-level civil servants who would rule in the interests of the British empire. His argument was that this particular form of the university in India has been detrimental to India’s system of innovation.  The establishment of an indigenous Maori university in New Zealand–Te Whare Wānanga o Awanuiārangi–with a focus on local  knowledge and pedagogical approaches, is a further example of an initiative that aims at confronting the political/colonial nature of the university and its system of knowledge.  Finally, one of us (Kris) was in Washington DC last week at a NAFSA meeting, and an interesting discussion emerged about a new International Association of Universities (IAU) initiative designed to “re-examine the concept of internationalization.” As the IAU puts it:

Is the concept and the definition of internationalization keeping up with developments in higher education? Is there a shared understanding of the concept? Has internationalization lost sight of its central purposes?

IAU is posing these and other questions in a reflection directly in line with the findings of the 3rd Global Survey on Internationalization. The Survey clearly points out the differences in why internationalization is pursued in different parts of the world and how it impacts on various institutions in vastly diverse contexts. Furthermore, this initiative is a natural sequel to past normative efforts of the Association, such as the Policy Statement and Declaration and Checklist for Good Practice. The Ad hoc international Expert Group was created to bring together perspectives from all parts of the world inter alia to: assess the extent to which internationalization activities fit the current conceptual umbrella, to critically examine the causes that are leading to some questioning and even criticism of the concept and to investigate the ways to address these concerns.

We’d like to thank both C.K. Raju and Ben Wildavsky for engaging in this debate. We also look forward to insights that might be generated by the IAU’s initiative on Re-thinking Internationalization.

Kris Olds & Susan Robertson

ps: please note that there are endnotes in the response below.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

In his comments1 on the Penang conference on “Decolonising our universities”.2 Wildavsky suggests that the conference produced only silly rhetoric and complaints. Such deprecatory attitudes are commonplace,3 hence a systematic result of Western education.

That takes us to the roots of the differences between the Western university model and the non-Western models of higher learning. Those alternative models are provided, for example, by the historic Indian university of Nalanda (-5th c. CE, with international students even from China), or the Baghdad Bayt-al-Hikma (early 9th c. CE), which model spread throughout the Islamic world, including the Caliphate of Cordoba, and Toledo in Europe.

The Western university system started in Crusading times in Bologna (late 11th c. CE), shortly after the fall of Toledo brought its vast library under Christian control. (The exact “official” church start date for the Crusades is irrelevant, as pointed out in my paper presented at the conference.4)  That is, the Western university system originated in a change in church policy towards non-Christian books, from burning them to learning from them. This change of policy was justified by pretending that the imported knowledge—both its origin and content—were theologically correct. The fantastic claim was advanced that the secular knowledge in those Arabic books was all due to (theologically correct) early “Greeks”. This was intended to belittle the contributions of Muslims, black Egyptians, and others to that world knowledge. During the Inquisition, which followed, Europeans never dared acknowledge non-Christian sources and Western historians helped pass it all off as their own original ideas, as in the cases of Copernicus and Ibn Shatir, or Newton and calculus.5 This cumulative false history was later used by Hume, Kant6 and many others to justify racism. The “soft power” of that false history was amplified by Macaulay who used it to impose Western education (and the related indoctrination), and thus establish colonialism.7 The content of the imported non-Western knowledge was made theologically correct through reinterpretation (and by modifying the Christian doctrine to Christian rational theology, a modification8 of Islamic rational theology).

This paternal link between the church and the Western university persisted for centuries, with the church being the key consumer of the students produced by the university. The industrial revolution weakened the link, but did not sever it. In the middle of the 20th c., Harvard, Princeton, and Yale refused to keep Isaac Newton’s long-suppressed papers9 in their library, since he had detailed how the church had distorted the Bible. Even as late as 2003, after the secret was out, the Cambridge Newton scholar, Whiteside, tried to hang on to that falsehood by abusing me10 for pointing to that “cartload” of Newton’s suppressed papers. Scholars from Harvard are still defending those fairy tales about Greek achievements and the Copernican and Newtonian revolution.

In short, for much of its 900 years of existence, the Western university served a propagandist function, like the students it produced, and that tendency still persists. The aim, like that of the church, was to train students to persuade others, by any means, including false history. In contrast, in each of the above mentioned non-Western higher-learning models, students tried to convince themselves, for they were seeking truth, or wisdom, or the right way to live, so unethical tricks had no place at all.

This difference between the two models is also reflected in the processes of validating knowledge. In the West it is a hush-hush process: the “merit” of a Western academic is judged by papers published in journals where referees will review it in secret. Though this secretive process is touted as allowing referees greater freedom to criticise someone in authority, the process is widely used and perhaps intended to suppress those not in authority. It strongly resembles the system of censorship designed by the church to preserve its authority. Those critics who escaped the censor where suppressed by branding them “heretics”, just as critics, especially non-Westerners, are easily labelled as “cranks” today, for challenging Western authority, no arguments needed. That is especially so in hard sciences, where the majority of the Western educated are illiterate, and must rely on the guidance of authority to decide truth. (And scientists are forced to specialise, hence still depend upon authority to decide truth.) This “criterion of reputability” (as distinct from “refutability”) helped the church to sustain egregiously bad beliefs, like the date of creation set at 9 a.m. On 23 October 4004 BC by the Vice Chancellor of Cambridge. This procedure is of little value, if the aim is truth. The authority to decide “reputability” is today exercised by editors who secretively appoint referees. So, our faith in that system of validating knowledge rests largely on our faith in the honesty of editors and referees of scholarly journals.

Some editors and referees surely are honest, but all certainly are not. Objective claims about this system of validation are impossible (either way), since it is secretive, and has never been studied. “Horror stories” abound. For example, when credit for my work,11 called a paradigm shift in physics, was given to a former President of the Royal Society, by naming it after him,12 in consultation with him,13 and well after he was personally informed14 of my work, the editor of the American Mathematical Society just published some post-facto references to my work,15 and refused to permit me to bring out the fact that this was the second attempt. He stuck to the decision, despite a petition by many academics that I should have a right to reply. If this is what happens in full public view, one shudders at the thought of what happens under cover of secrecy.

In contrast, the transparent process of validating knowledge in India was one of public debate. So seriously were these debates taken, that a pundit (Mandana Misra) who had decided to die, and had buried himself up to his neck, waited before dying, in that condition, to complete the debate to which he was challenged. There were certain rules for settling debates. Ignorance or misrepresentation of the opponent’s position (purva paksha) meant the debate was lost. Wildavsky should note.

A refusal to ape the West is commonly misrepresented as an uncritical rejection! However, the consensus at the decolonisation conference was that, though Western universities have widely rejected non-Western knowledge as lacking contemporary significance,16 our rejection of the West would be a critical one.

So what would this critical rejection consist of? My own paper concerned hard sciences which helped to establish colonisation, and which remain the carrot today for Western education.17 As I explicitly stated, the aim was not to complain, as Wildavsky wrongly maintains, but to outline an alternative curriculum in (a) math, (b) science, and (c) the history and philosophy of science. The influence of the church on Western universities has led to the intrusion of Christian theology even into mathematics and science, which must be eliminated together with false history.

The part about history (of science) is easiest to understand. The West has surely contributed to knowledge, but that contribution has been vastly exaggerated by a false history which must be rejected. Standard Western texts still attribute most pre-Crusade science to the Greeks, and then jump to post-renaissance Western sources.18 This false history “softened” influential but gullible sections of the colonised, who believed it without checking.19 It enabled Macaulay to amplify that “soft power” by instituting colonial education—a key means of indoctrination which helped to create an elite class of colonised, loyal to the coloniser, who sustained colonialism. Accordingly, for decolonisation, this false history must first be discarded, from “Euclid” and “Claudius Ptolemy”, to Copernicus and the claim that Newton invented the calculus.20 Regrettably, many Western journals (and even discussion lists) still suppress discussion of this in their forums. Obviously, decolonisation cannot be done by first asking the West for permission the way Wildavsky misrepresents the conference petition to Unesco! Why should one validate this changed history according to Western norms of subjecting oneself to their secretive editorial control? Let it be validated on the non-Western norm of open debate. Let the earlier Western claims be so validated. It is to encourage this that I have offered a prize of RM 10,000 (around USD 3300) for reliable primary evidence about the existence of “Euclid”.21

The connection of math to theology is a bit harder to understand. Western mathematics started off with Egyptian mystery geometry, which understood mathematics as mathesis or a means to arouse the soul and make it remember its past lives (as in the story of Socrates and the slave boy, in Plato’s Meno.). That notion of soul was cursed by the post-Nicene church22 while the post-Crusade church reinterpreted math as a doctrine of reason to be used for persuasion,23 to help convert Muslims. This had an interesting fallout on the calculus. The 16th c. Jesuits based in Cochin applied the Toledo model of translation to India, to import the Indian calculus to a Europe barely learning decimal arithmetic.24 The infinities of calculus were naturally confounded with the eternity of theology, and that befuddled Europeans like Descartes25 who blundered and stated that the length of a curved line is beyond the human mind. (In India children were taught to measure it using a string!26) Newton thought he had resolved the issue with his “fluxions”, which only made time metaphysical,27 and eventually led to the failure of his physics. The present-day formal math of Russell and Hilbert derives from that wrong belief, contrary to commonsense, that Western metaphysics is universal and more reliable than physics. It teaches that the problem with calculus is resolved by limits, using formal real numbers erected using set theory. This biased metaphysics28 has nil practical value (except for purposes of indoctrination), and makes elementary math difficult. It lacks conceptual clarity: 450 years of effort on the calculus by the best in the West have still not given us a clear definition of the derivative which tells us whether or not a discontinuous function is differentiable for physical applications.29

The new math curriculum discards limits, formal math and set theory as arising from religiously biased Western metaphysics.30 It teaches calculus without limits based on the realistic philosophy of zeroism.31 The course has been successfully tested through actual experiments on 5 groups. This new technique better suits practical mathematics, using computer technology (without having to say that computer arithmetic is forever erroneous), and it also fits better with the atomistic beliefs of al Ashari and others. As expected, some Westerners have responded in propaganda mode: the editor of a Cambridge journal solicited my book for review, and the reviewer simply denied the existence of this philosophy!32 He falsely stated that I was not trained in math, along with other assorted lies! (Seems to be pattern here!) There is also a cover-up operation going on on the fundamental issue I raised a decade ago:33 that logic is neither culturally universal, nor empirically certain, a point which undermines most Western philosophy, not just mathematics.34

The other curriculum change I suggested was in physics. Since physics rests on math, a religious bias in math is bound to creep into physics. Thus, the first lesson in physics today relates to Newton’s “laws”. However, the belief that the cosmos is governed by eternal “laws” is not a scientific (refutable) belief, but is part of post-Crusade theology.35 This is an anti-Islamic belief, and has been recently used by newspapers such as the Guardian, London, to run down Islam as intrinsically anti-scientific.36 I also went into the content of Newton’s “laws”, and during my talk, I experimentally demonstrated that they fail: because Newton’s laws are reversible while most mundane experience is irreversible. As pointed out at the start of my talk,37 it is, of course, possible to save any theory from any experiment by piling on the hypothesis, as is done in current university texts in thermodynamics.38 Though relativity arose as a correction to Newton’s mistake in making time metaphysical,39 while trying to make the calculus rigorous (and not due to the Michelson-Morley experiment,40 as incorrectly taught in current university texts), its proper understanding was derailed, because Einstein grabbed credit for it,41 without fully understanding the theory.42 Einstein went on to become a figure of great scientific authority, and because the Western technique of validation is to rely on authority, scientific development was derailed for a century. Einstein is, thus, a key example to demonstrate the failure of Western methods of validating knowledge. (Scientifically illiterate Westerners who would rush to the stock device of condemning this thesis as “crank”, should pause to consider the point mentioned earlier, why the person ranked the best mathematician in the world, wanted credit for same thesis, in his Einstein centenary lecture!)

To summarise, the following changes were proposed. (1) Eliminate the falsehoods in Western history. (2) Eliminate the religious bias in formal math and (3) in physics, by teaching calculus without limits and functional differential equations, respectively. Naturally, I also pointed to the dimension of hegemony. Referring these changes to Western-endorsed experts would raise a conflict of interests, for their lifetime accumulation of academic “merit” might vanish overnight if they agreed to the changes. So, there must be a change in the process, not merely the particulars of the curriculum. Hence, for these proposed curriculum changes to be successfully implemented, a fourth change is first needed. (4) A new model of validating knowledge, by eliminating the bad technique of reliance on the opinions of Western-endorsed experts articulated in secret. That technique encourages subservience to the West; if these “experts” have anything to say, they should debate it publicly. Instead of papers published, through a secretive process, I have proposed to measure academic merit by public debate and the demonstrable benefits to the community. This would expose the coopted colonised elite.

The West might impose its educational model on client governments, but it is amusing to claim, as Wildavsky does, that the Western university model is perfect, so there is no alternative but to ape it. One could more confidently assert the opposite: that the West has little alternative but to implement the recommendations made above. For example, bad math education was one reason for the sub-prime crisis: the managers (from the best Western universities) lacked a personal understanding of the complex math of financial derivatives, and the risks they were taking. The traditional Western route of assimilating non-Western knowledge by attributing it to a Westerner has failed this time! So, it is time for Western universities to openly acknowledge and accept non-Western knowledge if they are not to decline swiftly!

C. K. Raju

Notes:

3 See for example, my recent debate in H-Asia, with Witzel, from Harvard, which is archived on my blog, http://ckraju.net/blog/?p=56 and previous entries, and elsewhere on the Internet. Witzel grandly announced that I had made a silly mistake in supposing that early Indian dice were cubic, and explained that this mistake arose due to bad translation. In fact, my paper never mentioned the word “cube” (I spoke of dice with five faces!), and I did my own translations, and so on. In the absence of a public rejoinder, Witzel’s absurdities would have stood on the reputation of Harvard. The debate also brings out what I regard as the essence of racism: double standards. Thus, Harvard historians use one process to date manuscripts purportedly coming from “Greeks”, and another for Indian manuscripts.

5 A brief summary is in C. K. Raju, Is Science Western in Origin? (Multiversity, 2009). More details and references in C. K. Raju, Cultural Foundations of Mathematics (Pearson Longman, 2007)

6 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991, pp. 110–1.

7 C. K. Raju, Ending Academic Imperialism: a Beginning, Citizens International, Penang, 2011. Draft available from http://multiworldindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/ckr-Tehran-talk-on-academic-imperialism.pdf. Also, “Ending Academic Imperialism in the Hard Sciences: a Beginning”, chp. 7 in Confronting Academic Knowledge, ed. Sue-San Gahremani Ghajar and Seyyed-Abdolhamid Mirhosseini, Iran University Press, Tehran, 2011.

8 C. K. Raju, “Benedict’s Maledicts”, Indian Journal of Secularism, 10(3) (2006) pp. 79-90. At http://www.zcommunications.org/benedicts-maledicts-by-c-k-raju. Also, “Islam and science”, Indian Journal of Secularism, 15(2), 2011, pp. 14-29.

9 C. K. Raju, “Newton’s secret”, chp. 4 in The Eleven Pictures of Time (Sage, 2003).

10 http://mathforum.org/kb/thread.jspa?threadID=383971&messageID=1184812#1184812 “[HM] Raju’s postings on the topic “Unpublished manuscripts of Newton ?” This post is not part of the main thread at http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=1184738&tstart=0#reply-tree. Clearly he persisted in trying to suppress the truth about Newton by abusing me. My response was that, on my tradition, resorting to abuse was a sure sign of loss in debate.

11 C. K. Raju, Time: Towards a Consistent Theory (Kluwer, 1994), chp. 5B, http://arxiv.org/pdf/0808.0767v1. The Eleven Pictures of Time, cited above. Also, “The electrodynamic 2-body problem and quantum mechanics”, Found. Phys. 34, 2004, pp. 937–62.

12 G. W. Johnson and M. E. Walker , “Sir Michael Atiyah on the Nature of Space”, Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 53(6), 2006, pp. 674-678. Annotated excerpts at: http://ckraju.net/atiyah/Johnson_Walker_excerpt.pdf.

13 See email by M. E. Walker that Atiyah did indeed see the work prior to publication. http://ckraju.net/atiyah/Walker_email.pdf.

15 M. Walker, “Retarded Differential Equations and Quantum Mechanics”. Notices of the American Mathematical Society 54(4), 2007, p. 472. Available at http://www.ams.org/notices/200704/commentary-web.pdf (scroll to the 2nd page). However, the Society for Scientific Values later found a prima facie case against Atiyah, see http://www.scientificvalues.org/cases.html, case no. 2 of 2007, Atiyah-Raju case.

16 Thus, while there are separate departments for studying Indian philosophy, say, it would be difficult to find any reference to that in discussions of the current philosophy of science. See, also, the debate with Witzel, cited above.

17 Ending Academic Imperialism, cited above.

18 Is Science Western in Origin? Multiversity, Penang, 2009. Also available as a Kindle book.

19 E.g. Ram Mohun Roy, see, Ending Academic Imperialism, cited above.

20 C. K. Raju, Cultural Foundations of Mathematics, Pearson Longman, 2007.

21 For some idea of what is not reliable, see, C. K. Raju, “Goodbye Euclid!”, Bharatiya Samajik Chintan 7 (4) (New Series), 2009, pp. 255–264. http://ckraju.net/papers/mathEducation1Eculid.pdf

22 C. K. Raju, “The curse on ‘cyclic’ time”, chp. 2 in The Eleven Pictures of Time, Sage, 2003.

23 “The Religious Roots of Mathematics”, Theory, Culture & Society 23(1–2) 2006, Spl. Issue ed. Mike Featherstone, Couze Venn, Ryan Bishop, and John Phillips, pp. 95–97.

24 Cultural Foundations of Mathematics, cited above.

25 R. Descartes, The Geometry, trans. D. Eugene and M. L. Latham, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1996, , Book 2, p. 544.

26 C. K. Raju, “The Indian Rope Trick”, Bharatiya Samajik Chintan 7 (4) (New Series) (2009) pp. 265–269, at http://ckraju.net/papers/MathEducation2RopeTrick.pdf.

27 C. K. Raju, “Time: What is it That it can be Measured” Science&Education, 15(6), 2006, pp. 537–551.

28 C. K. Raju, “Teaching mathematics with a different philosophy. 1: Formal mathematics as biased metaphysics” Science and Culture, 77 (7-8), 2011, pp. 275-80.

29 Briefly, a discontinuous function is not differentiable on undergraduate calculus, but is differentiable on the Schwartz theory of distributions. But neither definition can be directly used for the nonlinear differential equations of physics, in the presence of shocks. The better way out is to appeal to the empirical, rather than Western mathematical authority. See, “Renormalization and shocks”, appendix to Cultural Foundations of Mathematics, cited above. An earlier paper from the days when I still believed in formal math is “Distributional Matter Tensors in Relativity”, Proceedings of the 5th Marcel Grossmann Meeting on General Relativity, ed. D. Blair and M. J. Buckingham, World Scientific, Singapore, 1989, pp. 421–23. http://arxiv.org/pdf/0804.1998v1.

30 C. K. Raju, “Teaching mathematics with a different philosophy. 1: Formal mathematics as biased metaphysics” Science and Culture, 77 (7-8), 2011, pp. 275-80.

31 C. K. Raju, “Teaching mathematics with a different philosophy. 2: Calculus without limits” Science and Culture, 77 (7-8), 2011, pp. 281-86., and “Calculus without limits: report of an experiment”, presented at the 2nd People’s Education Congress, Mumbai, 2009. (http://ckraju.net/papers/Calculus-without-limits-presentation.pdf)

32 The reviewer adopted the extraordinary procedure of reviewing only two chapters of the book, justifying this with the preposterous claim that there was no philosophy beyond that in the book! Assuming the reviewer was not illiterate, he could hardly have missed the new philosophy articulated in chp. 3 and chp. 8. So much for the trust in Western editors! (If the reviewer was illiterate, the fault still lies with the editor.)

33 C. K. Raju, “Computers, mathematics education, and the alternative epistemology of the calculus in the Yuktibhasa”, Philosophy East and West, 51(3) (2001) pp. 325-61. Available from http://ckraju.net/papers/Hawaii.pdf.

34 See my article on “Logic” in the Springer Encyclopedia of Non-Western Science, Technology and Medicine, 2008. Draft at http://ckraju.net/papers/Nonwestern-logic.pdf.

35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First part of the Second Part, 91,1.

36 C. K. Raju, “Islam and science”, Indian Journal of Secularism, 15(2), 2011, pp. 14-29.

37 See the presentation at http://ckraju.net/papers/decolonising.pdf, and the video at http://vimeo.com/26506961. My talk is the first half hour.

38 C. K. Raju, “Thermodynamic time” Physics Education (India) 9, 1992, pp.44-62.

39 C. K. Raju, “Einstein’s time” chp. 3b, in Time: Towards a Consistent Theory, cited above, and article in Science and Education, cited above.

40 C. K. Raju, “The Michelson-Morley Experiment”, Physics Education 8, 1991, pp. 193-200.

41 The reference on “Einstein’s time” above has numerous quotes from Poincare. This is also explained for the layperson in The Eleven Pictures of Time, cited above.

42 The suggested curriculum change counters Einstein’s mistake, explained in “Electromagnetic time”, chp. 5b in Time: Towards a Consistent Theory, cited above. http://arxiv.org/pdf/0808.0767v1. Difficulties in this matter, which arose during the Groningen debate are clarified in “The electrodynamic 2-body problem…”, cited above. http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0511235v1. There is an online explanation of some of this for the layperson at http://ckraju.net/misc/Einstein.html.

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